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Objectivity and Independence: The Dual Roles of External Auditors and 
Forensic Accountants
ABSTRACT
This  paper  is  aimed at  illustrating  that  certain  capacities  exist  whereby the dual  role  of  the 
external auditor (in undertaking internal audit roles as well as skilled persons roles) could be 
exercised  to  the  optimal  and maximum benefit  of  an  entity or  organisation.  It  also  aims  to 
accentuate on why a return to and focus on traditional auditing techniques, as well as auditing 
techniques which focus on  internal controls is a much needed move. In so doing, it contributes 
to  the  extant  literature  by  highlighting  why  such  a  move  should  be  facilitated,  as  well  as 
proposing  means  whereby such  a  move  would  be  facilitated  -  namely,  through  a  focus  on 
benefits which could be derived where the external auditor is able to incorporate certain internal 
audit  responsibilities.  The  paper  also  draws  attention  to  safeguards  which  require  due 
consideration  if  the  ever  important  attributes  of  objectivity  and  independence  are  not  to  be 
compromised. Risks associated with the overlapping roles of testifying and consulting experts in 
Forensic Accounting will also be considered in this paper.
Whilst the benefits and potentials of the dual roles assumed by external auditors are emphasized, 
as  well  as  the  need  to  ensure  that  safeguards  operating  to  guard  against  a  compromise  of 
objectivity and independence are in place, authors' opinions in support of dual roles also take 
into consideration the utmost priority of ethical values. The paper hence also highlights the fact 
that  such  dual  roles  are  appropriate  in  certain  cases  –  as  illustrated  by  justifications  for 
limitations imposed by the Sarbanes Oxley Act and other relevant and applicable legislation – 
even though instances also persist where section 201 of Sarbanes-Oxley, with regard to internal 
audit outsourcing, may have been over-reactionary and may continue to hinder both companies 
and their auditors.
Key  Words:  independence,  objectivity,  Sarbanes  Oxley  Act,  FSMA section  166,  ISA 610, 
Amended Rule 26 (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 26)
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Objectivity and Independence: The Dual Roles of External Auditors and 
Forensic Accountants
James Di Gabriele1 and Marianne Ojo2
Introduction
This paper considers the dual roles of both external auditors and forensic accountants: whether 
acting in the dual capacity of external auditor and internal auditor (with respect to internal and 
external audits), as well as whether the overlapping roles of testifying and consulting experts3 
(with respect to forensic accountants) do (significantly or not significantly), affect the objectivity 
and independence attributes required  in exercising their functions.
It is also important to highlight that a consideration of the dual roles of the external auditor and 
internal  auditor  will  involve  examining  whether  it  is  appropriate  for  the  external  auditor  to 
incorporate internal audit responsibilities in certain circumstances (as provided for by ISA 610, 
Using the Work of Internal Auditors,  as well as provisions of the Sarbanes Oxley Act which 
imposes limitations on external auditors' abilities to perform in a dual capacity - particularly with 
respect to internal audit outsourcing services). It will consider the impact of the performance in 
such a dual capacity on the ability of the external and internal audit work to be carried out with 
the required attributes of objectivity and independence.
With respect to the above paragraph, focus will therefore be placed on the perspective of the 
external auditor performing internal audit functions - although the paper will also consider to a 
great  extent,  internal  audit  concepts,  the  internal  audit  function,  certain  definitions,  and 
ultimately, the overlapping roles of testifying and consulting experts in forensic accounting.
1 Email: jim@dmcpa.com
2 Email: marianneojo@hotmail.com
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 For  further  information on this,  see J  DiGabriele,  "An Observation of  Differences  in  the Transparent 
Objectivity of Forensic Accounting Expert Witnesses, Journal of Forensic & Investigative Accounting Vol.3, Issue  
2, Special Issue, 2011
3According to  Stewart  and Subramaniam (2010),4 the motivation for  increased interest  in  the 
objectivity and independence of internal audit is associated with "the evolving and expanding 
role of internal audit as key corporate governance mechanism, as well as an internal consultancy 
service.  In  this  respect,  internal  auditors  occupy  the  unique  position  as  providers  of  both 
assurance  services  within  the  organization,  and  consultancy  services  to  managers."  The 
controversial debates which such dual role has generated, as well as the dual role's impact in 
placing internal auditors in a situation where conflicts of interest, and a compromise of "true 
objectivity" may arise, was also highlighted.5 
The structure of this paper is organised as follows. The ensuing section  recalls the concepts of 
integrity, independence and objectivity and is aimed at highlighting their significance as ethical 
values and attributes in the exercise of audit and accounting functions. Section B then illustrates 
how  the  focus  within  accounting  and  audit  roles  have  changed  over  the  years,  as  well  as 
highlights why there is need for a return to, and focus on traditional auditing techniques.  Certain 
duties  and  responsibilities  which  the  auditor  is  capable  of  undertaking  and  is  permitted  to 
undertake by law, as well as prohibited activities under various legislation will be considered 
under section C. The subsequent section (D), then considers the dual role of the external auditor 
as a skilled person, as well as safeguards which are in place to ensure that a compromise of 
independence and objectivity, whilst performing delegated functions, does not occur. Section E 
evaluates  the  impact  of  internal  auditor  compensation  on  external  auditor  objectivity  and 
independence whilst empirical evidence, relating to whether audit independence is compromised, 
where external auditors serve in  dual capacities, is assessed under section F. The impact of the 
overlapping roles of testifying and consulting experts in forensic accounting, as well as that of 
the  Amended  Rule  26  (Federal  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure  Rule  26),  on  objectivity  and 
independence in forensic accounting is then considered before a conclusion is drawn.
4
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 J Stewart and N Subramaniam, " Internal Audit Independence and Objectivity: Emerging Research 
Opportunities" January 2010 at page 4
5
5
 See reference to Paape, 2007; ibid ("Corporate Governance: The Impact on the Role, Position, and Scope 
of  Services  of  the  Internal  Audit  Function,  Unpublished  PhD  Dissertation,  Erasmus  Research  Institute  of 
Management, Erasmus University, Netherlands).
4A. Integrity, Independence and Objectivity: Key Attributes in External and Internal  
Audits
The  APB  (Auditing  Practices  Board)  Ethical  Standards  are  concerned  with  the  integrity, 
objectivity and independence of auditors (paragraph 5). 
− Integrity is a prerequisite for all those who act in the public interest. It is essential that 
auditors act, and are seen to act, with integrity, which requires not only honesty but a 
broad range of related qualities such as fairness, candour, courage, intellectual honesty 
and confidentiality (paragraph 7).6
− Objectivity, according to the definition provided by the APB, is considered to be "a state 
of mind that excludes bias, prejudice and compromise and that gives fair and impartial 
consideration to all matters that are relevant to the task in hand, disregarding those that 
are not".7 
Paragraph 13 distinguishes between objectivity and independence:
"Independence  is  freedom  from situations  and  relationships  which  make  it  probable  that  a 
reasonable and informed third party would conclude that objectivity either is impaired or could 
be impaired. Independence is related to and underpins objectivity. However, whereas objectivity 
6
6
 See Auditing Practices Board, Ethical Standards 1 http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/APB/ES-
1-(Revised)-Integrity,-objectivity-and-inde-(1).aspx
7
7
 See paragraph 10, ibid
5is  a  personal  behavioral  characteristic  concerning  the  auditor’s  state  of  mind,  independence 
relates to the circumstances surrounding the audit, including the financial, employment, business 
and personal relationships between the auditor and the audited entity and its connected parties."
Other definitions of independence have been provided as follows (Beattie, Fearnley and Brandt; 
2001):8 
- "the conditional probability of reporting a discovered breach" by DeAngelo; the ability to resist 
client  pressure  (Knapp):  a  function  of  character  -  with  characteristics  of  integrity  and 
trustworthiness being essential (Magill and Previts); and an absence of interests that create an 
unacceptable risk of bias - this definition being provided by the AICPA White Paper definition 
(AICPA,  1997)  which  defines  independence  as  an  absence  of  interests  that  create  an 
unacceptable risk of bias.
Independence and objectivity are also considered to be key and crucial features of the internal 
audit  function.  According  to  the  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision,  "continuously 
performing similar tasks or routine jobs may negatively affect an individual internal auditor's 
capacity for critical  judgment because of possible loss of objectivity.  It  is  therefore a sound 
practice,  whenever  practicable  and  without  jeopardising  competence  and  expertise,  to 
periodically  rotate  internal  audit  staff  within  the  internal  audit  function."9  Furthermore,  the 
Committee recommends that remuneration of top officials of the internal audit function should 
be determined correspondingly with the remuneration policies and practices of the organisation 
or bank (since independence and objectivity are thought to be undermined where internal audit 
8
8
 V Beattie, S Fearnley and R Brandt, Behind Closed Doors: What Company Audit Is Really About (Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales), 2001 at page 19
9
9
 It is also added that " The independence and objectivity of the internal audit function may be undermined if 
the internal audit staff's remuneration is linked to the financial performance of the business lines for which they 
exercise internal audit responsibilities." Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, "The Internal Audit Function in 
Banks" June 2012, pages 5 (particularly paragraphs 15 and 16)  www.bis.org/publ/bcbs223.pdf
6staff's  remuneration is  linked to  the financial  performance of  sector  for which internal  audit 
responsibilities are carried out).
Further, integrity, objectivity and independence constitute vital principles - in respect of ethical 
principles which are considered to be essential to the exercise and conduct of the internal audit 
function.  These  principles  are  mentioned  under  the  first  four  principles  relating  to  the 
supervisory  expectations  which  are  considered  relevant  to  the  internal  audit  function.  The 
principles ( Basel Committee on Banking Supervision; 2012) are as follows:10
Principles relating to the supervisory expectations relevant to the internal audit function 
Principle 1: An effective internal audit function provides independent assurance to the board of 
directors and senior management on the quality and effectiveness of a bank’s internal control, 
risk management and governance systems and processes, thereby helping the board and senior 
management protect their organisation and its reputation. 
Principle 2: The bank's internal audit  function must be independent of the audited activities, 
which requires the internal audit function to have sufficient standing and authority within the 
bank, thereby enabling internal auditors to carry out their assignments with objectivity. 
Principle 3: Professional competence, including the knowledge and experience of each internal 
auditor and of internal auditors collectively, is essential to the effectiveness of the bank’s internal 
audit function. 
Principle 4: Internal auditors must act with integrity.
From what has been highlighted so far, great focus is attached to the importance of objectivity 
and independence as pre requisites in exercising internal and external audit functions. Threats 
10
1
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, "The Internal Audit Function in Banks" June 2012 at page 2 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs223.pdf
7which  are  common  and  are  likely  to  compromise  objectivity  and  independence,  during  the 
exercise of internal and external audit functions, will now be analysed.
The  Institute  of  Internal  Auditors  (IIA)'s  published  framework  of  independence  lists  seven 
threats to audit independence (which are similar to those threats faced by external auditors) and 
these threats include:11
- Self review threat
- Social pressures
- Economic interests
- Personal relationships
- Familiarity threat
- Cultural, racial and gender biases
- Cognitive biases
The Auditing Practices Board identifies the following  principal types of threats to the auditor’s 
objectivity and independence :12
• self-interest threat 13
11
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 J Stewart and N Subramaniam, " Internal Audit Independence and Objectivity: Emerging Research 
Opportunities" January 2010 at page 7
12
 See Auditing Practices Board, Ethical Standards 1 at pages 15-17 and paragraphs 35
http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/APB/ES-1-(Revised)-Integrity,-objectivity-and-inde-(1).aspx 
13
8• self-review threat 14
• management threat
• advocacy threat15
• familiarity (or trust) threat
• intimidation threat
B. Changing Roles of Internal and External Auditors
As well as evidence which suggests that the internal auditor's role has changed in recent years to 
one of a consultant nature, in contrast to that of a policing role,16 evidence has also been provided 
to  support  the  fact  that  the  external  auditor's  role  changed  during  the  nineties  from  that 
synonymous to a watch dog to a less vigilant and scrutinising role (Cunningham; 2006).17 Such 
evidence which include: 
e
 " A self-interest threat arises when the auditor has financial or other interests which might cause the auditor 
to be reluctant to take actions that would be adverse to the interests of the audit firm or any individual in a position 
to influence the conduct or outcome of the audit (for example, where the auditor has an investment in the audited 
entity, is seeking to provide additional services to the audited entity or needs to recover long-outstanding fees from 
the audited entity)", see ibid.
14
1
 " A self-review threat arises when the results of a non-audit service performed by the auditor or by others 
within the audit firm are reflected in the amounts included or disclosed in the financial statements (for example, 
where the audit firm has been involved in maintaining the accounting records, or undertaking valuations that are 
incorporated in the financial statements). In the course of the audit, the auditor may need to re-evaluate the work 
performed in the non-audit service. As, by virtue of providing the non-audit service, the audit firm is associated with 
aspects of the preparation of the financial statements, the auditor may be (or may be perceived to be) unable to take 
an impartial view of relevant aspects of those financial statements", ibid.
15
1
 This arises when "the audit firm undertakes work that involves acting as an advocate for an audited entity 
and supporting a position taken by management in an adversarial context (for example, by acting as a legal advocate 
for the audited entity in litigation or a regulatory investigation). In order to act in an advocacy role, the audit firm 
has to adopt a position closely aligned to that of management. This creates both actual and perceived threats to the 
auditor’s objectivity and independence", ibid.
16
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 J Stewart and N Subramaniam, " Internal Audit Independence and Objectivity: Emerging Research 
Opportunities" January 2010 at page 13
17
1
 See L Cunningham, "Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to Restructure the Industry 
Before it  Unravels" Boston College Law School Faculty Papers Paper 165 (2006) at page 23. Also see M Ojo, 
General Literature on the Audit Expectations Gap, Journal of Forensic Accounting, Vol. VIII, Nos. 1 & 2, January-
December 2007 
9− Firstly, the widening scope of audit firm services beyond the audit function - which has 
resulted  in  relationships  which  have  affected  audit  firms'  independence,18 secondly, 
increase in accounting irregularities during the 1990s which have arisen in the form of 
widespread premature revenue recognition and other forms of creative accounting, and 
thirdly, evidence of auditor ability to influence audit quality and liability risk.19
Traditional auditing techniques focus on internal controls and demonstrate the auditor's thorough 
reputation as compared to the lax and complacent attitude which has been evidenced through 
recent increases in creative accounting practices and the widespread use of off balance sheet 
instruments  as  illustrated  in  the  case  of  Enron.  For  this  reason,  a  return  to  and  focus  on 
traditional auditing techniques, as well as auditing techniques which focus on internal controls is 
a much needed move - whilst also supporting audits which also take into consideration, strategic 
and operational controls. Such a stance would be greatly facilitated in cases where an external 
auditor is able to undertake certain permitted internal audit responsibilities.
C. Limitations On the Use of Internal Audit Work and the Assumption of Internal  
Audit Roles - As Performed By External Auditors
In order to prevent or avoid situations where over reliance on internal audit work could result in 
a compromise of the external auditor's objectivity, certain safeguards serve to assist in "clarifying 
the circumstances where the work of the internal audit function cannot be used and therefore is 
prohibited." Such instances, as provided  for by the ISA 610 (Revised), paragraphs 14] are as 
follows:20
18
1
 see L Cunningham, page 24; This also supports the argument put forward that increased interest in the 
objectivity and independence of internal audits is linked to "the evolving and expanding role of internal audit as a 
key corporate governance mechanism, as well as an internal consultancy service"  J Stewart and N Subramaniam 
page 4; and the statement that "the scope of internal audit  has expanded in recent times to encompass operational 
and strategic controls and is moving away from the traditional finance audits - hence there is a reducing scope for 
reliance which however, depends on individual internal audit departments" see A Garrett,  "The Role of Internal 
Audits in External Audits" CAE Conference, Abu Dhabi 2013 18 November 2012.
19
1
 see L Cunningham, pages 24 and 25
20  See [ISA 610 (Revised), paragraph 14] and IFAC, "Basis for Conclusions, Prepared by the Staff of the IAASB" 
ISA 610 (Revised), Using the Work of Internal Auditors, and ISA 315 (Revised), Identifying and Assessing the 
10
- Where the function’s organizational status and relevant policies and procedures do not 
adequately support the objectivity of internal auditors; 
- Where the function lacks sufficient competence; or 
- Where the function does not apply a systematic and disciplined approach, including quality 
control. 
According  to  Paragraph  9  of  the  INTERNATIONAL STANDARD  ON  AUDITING  610 
(REVISED),21 the external auditor's sole responsibility for the audit opinion expressed, is not 
reduced  by  the  external  auditor’s  use  of  the  work  of  the  internal  audit  function  on  the 
engagement. 
Paragraph 24 also expressly states that the following information should be included in the audit 
documentation - where the external auditor incorporates the work of the internal audit function:
- Evaluation of whether the function’s organizational status and relevant policies and procedures 
adequately  support  the  objectivity  of  the  internal  auditors;  the  level  of  competence  of  the 
function;  and  whether  the  function  applies  a  systematic  and  disciplined  approach,  including 
quality control.
Risks of Material Misstatement through Understanding the Entity and Its Environment March 2012  at pages 6 
and 7.  Furthermore,  "Ensuring there are adequate safeguards  against  over  or  undue use of  the work of the 
internal  audit  function  (where  use  is  permissible)  by  strengthening  the  external  auditor’s  decision-making 
framework for determining the planned nature and extent of work of the internal audit function that can be used. 
In particular, more clearly articulating in the requirements that the external auditor must make all significant 
judgments in the audit engagement, and plan to use less of the work of the internal audit function and perform 
more of the work directly in circumstances where the assessed risk of material  misstatement is higher with 
special consideration given to risks identified as significant. Similarly, for the other factors,  elevating application 
material to incorporate in the requirement how the factors should influence the auditor’s judgments." [ISA 610 
(Revised), paragraphs 15-16]
21
2
 USING THE WORK OF INTERNAL AUDITORS 
(Effective for audits of financial statements for periods ending on or after December 15, 2013).
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- The nature and extent of the work used and the basis for that decision; and 
- The audit procedures performed by the external auditor to evaluate the adequacy of the work 
used.
Outsourcing and Co Sourcing of Internal Audit Services
As highlighted in the previous sections, there are certain duties and responsibilities which the 
external auditor is capable of undertaking and permitted to undertake by law. Under the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act, the prohibition of the external auditor's capacity to perform dual roles in respect of 
performing  certain  non  audit  services  which  include  internal  audit  outsourcing  services,  is 
highlighted.
Section 201 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 lists certain prohibited services which do not lie 
within  the  scope  of  practice  of  external  auditors  of  U.S  public  companies.  The  prohibited 
services22 are based on three primary criteria, namely:
i) An auditor cannot function in the role of management;
ii) An auditor cannot audit his or her work; and
iii) An auditor cannot serve in an external advocacy role for the client.
Internal audit outsourcing services constitute one of the services listed as prohibited and even 
though  the  provision  of  such  services  by  external  auditors  to  their  clients  is  no  longer 
permissible, it is reported by Ernst and Young (2006)23 that public accounting and specialist firms 
provide  these  services  to  non  audit  clients.  Section  201  of  Sarbanes-Oxley,  with  regard  to 
internal audit  outsourcing,  may have been over-reactionary and may continue to hinder both 
22
2
 Prohibited services include: 
- Book keeping or other services related to the accounting records or financial statements of the client 
whose statements are being audited;
- Financial reporting systems design and implementation;
- Internal audit outsourcing services.
23
2
 See J Stewart and N Subramaniam, " Internal Audit Independence and Objectivity: Emerging Research 
Opportunities" January 2010 at page 17 and Ernst &Young, Trends in Australian and New Zealand Internal  
Auditing, Third Annual Benchmarking Survey 2006, Ernst & Young, Australia.
12
companies and their auditors. The following sections relating to knowledge spill-over gains, cost 
management and financial reporting quality illustrate why.
Knowledge Spillover Gains
Knowledge spillover is the result of accounting firms benefiting from the relationship between 
the audit and non-audit services offered to their clients.  In the case of internal audit outsourcing, 
the  efficiency  of  financial  audits  is  bolstered  because  the  auditor  is  able  to  benefit  from 
knowledge gained during the performance of internal audit functions.  The auditor is able to gain 
a  better  understanding  of  the  client’s  internal  controls  because  the  auditor  has  had  close 
experience with the internal control environment as part of the client’s internal audit function. 
As stated earlier, the auditor is better equipped during the financial audit and the amount of work 
needed to document internal controls, assess control risk, and design tests of control is reduced. 
(Aldhizer, 2003)  The cost of performing the audit to the audit firm may also be lowered because 
of knowledge spillover gains, as Al-Harshani (2003) states in his dissertation:
Knowledge spillover may generate a quasi-economic rent to the audit firm, where the 
marginal cost of the joint provision of the two types of services to the same client is less 
than the marginal cost of separately providing the same amount of audit and NAS to two 
different clients. The joint provision, therefore, is expected to lead to lowering the cost of 
performing the external audit work. Accordingly,  we would expect the audit firm that 
provides both audit and NAS to the same audit client to rely less on the client's internal 
auditors'  work  as  a  cost-reduction  technique  due  to  potential  cost  savings  from 
knowledge spillover.
Cost Management
Audit firms are not the only party to monetarily benefit from the outsourcing of internal audit. 
Companies that outsource their internal audit function may reap potential cost benefits as well. 
In the article “Internal Audit Outsourcing” Aldhizer and Cashell (2003) explain:
13
For  companies,  outsourcing  the  internal  audit  function  offers  potential  cost  benefits. 
Internal audit outsourcing may reduce overlapping positions and audit effort by creating 
more  flexibility  in  increasing  and  decreasing  workloads.   Additionally,  outsourcing 
allows a company to replace "fixed" cost employees with "variable" fees for services. 
Finally,  a  wide  range  of  expertise  is  available  from  large  firms  that  would  be  too 
expensive for a company to maintain internally. 
Accounting Risk Management and Financial Reporting Quality
An investigation  by Prawitt et., al. (2011) found evidence that suggested that high quality 
internal audit functions (regardless of outsourcing) are associated with lower accounting risk. 
Furthermore,  Prawitt  et.  Al.  (2003) found that companies that  outsourced their  internal audit 
function to their external auditor prior to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley had lower accounting 
risk than companies that outsourced their internal audit function to another third-party service 
provider and companies that maintained their own in-house internal audit function.
Based on an empirical analysis of the relationship between restatements and non-audit 
fees paid by a client to its external auditor, it was found that companies that were not required to 
restate their financial statements paid more in internal audit outsourcing fees to their external 
auditors than companies that did, in fact, have to record material restatements (Prawitt et. Al. 
2003).  This evidence suggests a negatively correlating relationship between the outsourcing of 
internal audit functions and the occurrence of material financial restatements.
Arguments have also been put forward to bolster the stance that "an outsourced provider may be 
more independent than an in-house internal audit function since it is difficult for an employee to 
be truly independent of management, and that on the other hand, there also factors which could 
affect  the  objectivity  of  outsourced  providers  in  the  same  manner  that  external  auditor 
independence can be compromised."24 It  is  also argued  that  "regardless of whether  external 
24
2
 For instance, where the audit firm is dependent on a client for a major source of income and would not 
wish to lose such a client, self review threats etc; see ibid at pages 17 and 18
14
assurance is obtained for sustainability reports (which contain a combination of quantitative25 and 
qualitative  data),  that  internal  audit  can  play  a  role  in  verifying  this  data  for  management 
purposes."
The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) also recommends a list of factors to be considered when 
assessing  potential  outsourcing  engagements:26 available  resources,  size  of  the  organization, 
types of outsourcing alternatives,  Law, Statute,  or regulation (since some companies may be 
prohibited  by statute  or  regulation  from outsourcing internal  audit  services  to  their  external 
auditors),  taking  into  consideration  an  analysis  of  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of 
outsourcing, as well as the following:27 
- Independence of the external service providers
- Allegiance of in-house resources versus that of external service provider
- Professional standards followed by the external service provider
- Qualifications of the service provider
- Staffing – training, turnover, rotation of staff, management
- Flexibility in staffing resources to meet engagement needs or special requests
25
2
 Furthermore, "where information being verified is not quantifiable, internal auditors could face objectivity 
threats arising from social pressure and familiarity." see ibid at page 21
26
2
 Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), "The Role of Internal Auditing in Resourcing the Internal Audit 
Activity" IIA Position Paper January 2009 pages 4 and 5 https://na.theiia.org/standards-guidance/Public
%20Documents/IPPF_PP_Role_of_IA_in_Resourcing_the_IAA_01-09.pdf
27
2
 Other factors to be considered include "access to best practice or insight to alternative approaches; culture 
of the organization – receptiveness to external service providers; insight into the organization by the external service 
provider; coverage of remote locations; coordination with in-house internal  auditing;  coordination with external 
auditor; use of internal auditing as a training ground for internal promotions; retention, access to and ownership of 
work papers; acquisition and availability of specialty skills; cost considerations; and good standing membership in 
an appropriate professional organization." see ibid
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- Availability of resources
- Retention of institutional knowledge for future assignments
D. External Auditors Also Undertaking the Role of Skilled Persons
Section 166 of the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000 deals with the powers of 
the UK's financial services regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), to obtain a report 
by a skilled person (also referred to as a reporting accountant) to assist the FSA in performing its 
functions under the FSMA 2000.
In addition to its powers to appoint skilled persons to carry out certain functions under section 
166, sections 167 and 168 of the Act also empower the FSA to appoint competent persons to 
carry out investigative tasks.
The differences between the roles of skilled persons (also known as reporting accountants) and 
competent persons, are demonstrated by the bearer of the costs for work carried out by these 
persons. For work undertaken by skilled persons, the regulated firm (who employs them) bears 
the cost directly whilst for work undertaken by competent persons, the FSA bears the cost.28
According to Singh (2003), even though skilled persons are usually approved by the FSA, the 
role  is  usually  performed  by  auditors  of  the  regulated  firm.29 This  “raises  the  question  of 
independence since both roles of auditors of the regulated firm and skilled persons (or reporting 
accountants)  employed  by  the  regulator  (the  FSA)  are  distinct  roles  which  still  overlap 
occasionally.30 The use of skilled persons' reports has been controversial and concerns have been 
28
2
 See J Hitchins, M Hogg and D Mallet Banking: A Regulatory Accounting and Auditing Guide  Institute of 
Chartered Accountants England and Wales (2001) at page 295
29
2
 See D Singh, The Role of Third Parties in Banking Regulation and Supervision (2003) 4(3) Journal of 
30
3
 See ibid
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expressed in  relation to  the FSA using a  skilled person's  report  instead of  devoting its  own 
resources to investigating a matter.”31
Certain measures have been adopted to safeguard against possibilities of a conflict of interest 
arising between the auditors of the regulated firm who are commissioned by the FSA as skilled 
persons but paid by the regulated firm. Chapter Five of the FSA Supervision Manual provides 
examples of circumstances where the FSA may use skilled persons. According to chapter five of 
the Supervision Manual, the FSA states that firms are to appoint skilled persons only for specific 
purposes,  not  to  use  them as  a  matter  of  routine,  to  use  skilled  persons  only  after  having 
considered alternatives, to use skilled persons because of the added value to be gained due to 
their expertise or knowledge and not because of resource restraints, and to take into account cost 
implications as well as using the tool in a focused and proportionate way. 
E. The Impact of Internal Auditor Compensation on External Auditor's Objectivity  
and Independence
It is widely agreed in many academic and social spheres that compensation related performances 
have the potential and tendency to affect the objectivity and independence attributes required by 
an auditor to effectively perform his duties and responsibilities. Where an audit firm places great 
reliance on the income generated from a particular client (and particularly with respect to non 
audit  services),  there  are  greater  possibilities  for  situations  involving  threats  to  the  auditor's 
objectivity and independence, to occur - since such an audit firm will be unwilling to lose such a 
lucrative client. DeZoort et al (2001) argue that Institute of Internal Auditors' (IIA's) are vague in 
respect of factors which threaten internal auditor's objectivity.32 Their prior research is based on 
the  attribution  theory which  indicates  "that  external  auditors  should recognize  this  incentive 
bias".  Their  hypotheses  also  include  the  basic  statement  that  "the  effect  of  internal  auditor 
31
3
 See ibid at page 135
32
3
 DeZoort et al, "The Impact of Internal Auditor Compensation and Role on External Auditor's Planning 
Judgments and Decisions,  Contemporary Accounting Research, Summer 2001 Vol 18 Issue 2, p257 - 281 
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compensation on external auditors'  reliance judgments will  be greater  when internal auditors 
perform subjective tasks than when they perform objective tasks."
This can also be linked to the argument by Stewart and Subramaniam (2010)33 that objectivity 
issues and threats (arising from social pressure and familiarity) are more likely to arise when 
information  being  verified  by internal  audits  for  management  is  not  quantifiable.  The  more 
objective and quantifiable the information being dealt with, the less likelihood for the impact of 
internal  audit  compensation  to  significantly  affect  internal  audit  work  as  well  as  external 
auditors' reliance judgments.
Other Means of Safeguarding Audit Independence: Audit Committees
According to a publication by Grant Thornton (2010), "being on an audit committee is a part-
time job with full-time responsibilities. Audit committees rely heavily on the hands-on analysis 
provided  by  internal  and  external  auditors....."34 As  well  as  being  considered  a  "specialised 
committee within the board of directors - which prepares the work of, and reports to the board of 
directors in specific areas for which it has designated responsibility, other responsibilities of an 
audit committee are as follows (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision; 2012):35
- Monitoring of the financial reporting process, its output and integrity of the entity's financial 
statements;
- Oversight of the establishment of accounting policies and practices by the entity;
-  Reviewing the significant  qualitative aspects  of the entity's  accounting practices (including 
accounting  estimates  and  financial  statement  disclosures),  significant  financial  reporting 
33
3
 J Stewart and N Subramaniam, " Internal Audit Independence and Objectivity: Emerging Research 
Opportunities" January 2010 at page 21.
34
3
 Grant Thornton, "Evaluating the Internal and External Audit Function" The Audit Committee Guide Series 
2010 (adapted from the Audit Committee Handbook, Fifth Edition published by Wiley and Sons) page 1
35
3
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, "The Internal Audit Function in Banks" June 2012 at page 21 
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs223.pdf
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judgments contained in the statements, and arrangements through which staff of the entity may 
privately and confidentially raise concerns about. 
The audit committee is also responsible for "reviewing and monitoring the independence of the 
statutory  auditor  or  external  audit  firm;  reviewing  and  monitoring  the  statutory  auditor's 
objectivity, as well as the effectiveness of the audit process."36 
Other generally acknowledged responsibilities of audit committees include the appointment and 
assessment of remuneration for external auditors, ensuring that adequate resources exist for the 
internal  audit  function,  reviewing  and  reporting  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  firm or  entity's 
internal controls and ensuring that coordination37 is retained between the internal audit function 
and external auditors.
F. Empirical  Evidence  On  Whether  Audit  Independence  is  Compromised  Where  
External  Auditors  Serve  In  the  Dual  Capacities  (Exercising Both  External  and  
Internal Audit Functions): Results of a Study
According to a study by Geiger et al (2002)38, whose purpose partly consists in providing some 
empirical evidence on whether audit independence is compromised when external auditors serve 
in the dual capacities in exercising both external and internal audit functions,  " Little evidence 
exists  as  to  whether  financial  statement  users  believe that  auditor  independence or  financial 
36
3
 See ibid at pages 21 and 22
37
3
 Section  two  of  the  Guide  published  by  HM  Treasury  "Cooperation  Between  Internal  and  External 
Auditors", A Good Practice Guide, highlights the conditions necessary for effective cooperation and the benefits 
which can be gained. Such benefits include: "More effective audits based on a clearer understanding of respective 
audit roles and requirements; a reduced audit burden resulting in less disruption; a better informed dialogue on the 
risks facing the organisation or entity; better coordinated internal and external audit activity based on joint planning 
and communication of needs; increased scope for use by both internal and external auditors of each other's work; 
and the opportunity for each party to draw on a wider and more flexible skills base." HM Treasury "Cooperation 
Between  Internal  and  External  Auditors",  A  Good  Practice  Guide  http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/auditors_190105.pdf
38
3
 M Geiger, D Jordan Lowe and K Pany, "Outsourced Internal Audit Services and The Perception of Auditor 
Independence" The CPA Journal, http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2002/0402/features/f042002.htm
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statement reliability is jeopardized where the external auditors are engaged to perform internal 
audit activities."39
The study also made reference to some important observations: 
− That financial statement users may have perceived some positive synergy in performing 
internal  audit  work  for  the  external  audit  client.  This  dual  role  might  improve  audit 
quality by providing external auditors with greater insight into the client, making it more 
likely that  business  transactions  will  be understood and key audit  risks  identified.  In 
addition,  being  engaged  to  perform internal  audit  work  for  the  audit  client  may  be 
perceived as a signal of high quality work.
− Regardless of whether performing the internal audit work leads to a better external audit, 
or  performing the external audit  well  leads to  an internal audit  engagement,  the loan 
officers in their study perceived this relationship favorably. 
− While the AICPA has requested (and the SEC originally proposed) that CPA firms should 
be strictly prohibited from performing outsourced internal audits for public attest clients, 
the study suggests that external auditors performing outsourced internal audit work for 
clients was not, by itself, perceived negatively.
G. Objectivity  and the  Overlapping Roles  of  Testifying and Consulting  Experts  in  
Forensic Accounting
Forensic  accounting  experts  are  usually classified  among the  following three  groups;  expert 
witness (testifying expert),  consulting expert,  and fact witness.  An expert witness  generally 
39
3
  Furthermore,  results of their study "provide important insights into the effects of various internal audit 
outsourcing arrangements. The findings support the former AICPA position that having outsourced internal audit 
activities performed by the company’s external audit firm does not, by itself, appear to negatively affect financial 
statement  users’  perceptions  of  auditor  independence  and  other  related  decisions.  This  type  of  outsourcing 
arrangement would be expected to increase in the future if audit firms are allowed to provide these services to their 
clients. While the SEC and AICPA have implemented certain constraints regarding these arrangements, in certain 
cases audit firms are still allowed to provide these services." 
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appears before a Trier of fact (Judge and/or Jury) and provides an opinion by  deposition or 
testimony before the court. A consulting expert can advise on an attorney’s work  product by 
providing additional support in resolving a case. When an accounting expert is called to testify as 
a fact finding witness, he or she is expected to offer only factual analysis regarding the case 
without  rendering  an  opinion  (Michaelson,  2005).  The  main  differences  lie  between  the 
testifying expert and consulting expert.
The testifying expert must be mindful of the Daubert standard, which is codified in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence 702 and states; a witness may only testify if, the testimony is based upon 
sufficient facts or data, the testimony is the product of  reliable principles and methods, and the 
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably  to the facts of the case. This standard 
creates an environment where an expert’s opinion should  maintain a character of transparent 
objectivity. Conversely, a consulting expert owes objectivity to the client rather than the Trier of 
fact. A consulting expert advocates their position on a  client’s behalf (Michaelson, 2005). 
The perception of objectivity is an important element for a forensic accountant engaging  in 
expert testimony. The transparency of an experts’ impartiality is vital from a critical position 
because this  ultimately establishes  the credibility of  the expert’s  findings.  As exemplified in 
Monsanto v. Tidball (2009) (Monsanto), the defendant retained an accountant and tax professor 
to consult on economic damages claimed. The expert eventually testified in the case. According 
to the Court, there were reservations regarding the expert’s objectivity and ultimately deemed the 
report “unreliable and unable to assist the jury.” The expert was referred as a consultant and 
expert  throughout  the  case  literature.  These  dual  roles  likely occur  as  the  litigation  process 
develops and the mounting costs conceivably prohibit the addition of a second expert exclusively 
for  testimony.  This  quandary  compels  litigation  attorneys  to  put  forward  an  expert  initially 
retained in a consulting role hoping for the best result (Pedneault 2009).40
40  For further information, see  J DiGabriele, „An Observation of Differences in the Transparent Objectivity of 
Forensic Accounting Expert Witnesses „ Journal of Forensic & Investigative Accounting Vol. 3, Issue 2, Special 
Issue, 2011 
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Ethical risks persist with the revised rules as regards Amended Rule 26 Communications41 and 
particularly with reference to the fact that full disclosure of draft expert reports (as well as the 
expansive  disclosure  of  communications  between  experts  and  attorneys)  will  no  longer  be 
required.  As  argued,42 attorney  influence  on  the  objectivity  and  independence  of  testifying 
experts is likely to increase, not only as a result of the dual roles assumed by the testifying and 
consulting  expert,  but  also  because  of  the  consequences  of  the  Amended  Rule  26 
Communications (as regards disclosures).
Even though cost considerations are partly attributed to the revised rules (Amended Rule 26 
Communications), cost savings could still be achieved through a focus on cost reductions during 
the discovery phase  – and particularly also owing to the fact that:
− The majority of the cost of litigation is incurred during the discovery phase; and
− A focus on the final opinion of the testifying expert – rather than the thought process, will 
help mitigate and minimise overall cost expenditure.“43
Unncessarily  protracted  discovery costs  should  be  avoided.  Given the  nature  of  the  process 
involving  the  final  opinions  of  the  testifying  expert  and  the  tendency  for  attorneys  to  do 
everything possible to waive or shift opinions in favour of their clients, greater measures should 
be in place to avoid potential manipulations of opinions (of the testifying expert - particularly) or 
potentials for the objectivity and independence of the testifying expert to be influenced. The 
increased protection afforded to attorney and expert communications via the waiver of the need 
41  For further information on the revised rules, see J Di Gabriele „A Narrative Inquiry of the Inchoate Ethical Risks 
of <forensic Accounting Experts under Amended Rule 26 Communications, Ethics & Critical Thinking Journal 
(Volume 2012 Issue 1) 
42 See ibid
43  Ibid 
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for full  disclosures of such communications would only increase the likelihood that attorney 
influence (over objectivity and independence of testifying expert opinions) will increase.
H. Conclusion
It  has  been demonstrated that  certain  capacities exist  in  which the dual  role  of  the external 
auditor (in undertaking internal audit roles as well as skilled persons roles) could be immensely 
beneficial to an entity or organisation. This arises as a result of the invaluable skills and expertise 
which such a role provides and incorporates into the audit process. Even where such an exercise 
of a dual role is prohibited by law or as a result of organisational policies, opportunities exist 
whereby close cooperation between external and internal auditors could provide for increased 
scope in implementing and benefiting from each other's work. The opportunities and benefits of 
drawing on the skills and expertise gained by an external auditor who has acquired so much 
knowledge by virtue of  the exercise  of  both roles and the experience acquired from having 
exercised such roles, should not be under estimated.
As  recommended  in  chapter  five  of  the  Supervision  Manual  of  the  FSA,  there  are  certain 
situations whereby such a dual role may not be warranted, where such dual roles should not be 
exercised routinely, where such dual role should only be implemented after having considered 
other alternatives, and more importantly, why such dual role could contribute and generate added 
value by virtue of the increased expertise or knowledge which such a dual role brings. Where 
concerns relating to a compromise of independence and objectivity arise, then prohibitions and 
restrictions imposed by section 201 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act are, to a great extent, justified.
As stated previously in this paper, under section B, a return to and focus on traditional auditing 
techniques, as well as auditing techniques which focus on internal controls is a much needed 
move - whilst also supporting (internal) audits which to a greater extent, take into consideration, 
strategic and operational controls. Such a stance would be greatly facilitated in cases where an 
external auditor is able to undertake certain permitted internal audit responsibilities.
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There  is  support  for  the  opinion  that  a  certain  degree  of  compromise  of  objectivity  and 
independence does occur where the forensic accounting expert assumes a dual role (acts in both 
capacities  of  testifying  expert  and  consulting  expert).  However,  the  degree  to  which  such  a 
compromise  occurs  is  another  issue.  Where  reliable,  well  tested  techniques  have  been 
incorporated into the process, then the disadvantages of having a forensic accountant acting in 
both  capacities/roles  may be  mitigated  or  nullified  by  the  potential  advantages  in  having  a 
forensic accountant in both positions.
As is particularly the case with external auditors, the reliability of internal controls also plays a 
huge and crucial role in the audit process - as well as those in charge of those internal controls. 
Where safeguards such as the segregation of duties and other measures are incorporated into the 
process  to  reduce  instances  or  situations  whereby such controls  could  be  manipulated,  then 
benefits of having an external auditor serve in a dual role capacity may well extend beyond its 
stated disadvantages. 
Benefits  accruing from having a dual  role  include namely the acquisition of knowledge and 
expertise gained during the latter stages of the process - which could assist in providing more 
accurate judgments during latter stages of the process. This is also similar to the position which 
exists with external auditors: whereby the mandatory rotation of audit firms, whilst serving to 
ensure that independence and objectivity is not compromised, could also be detrimental where 
the external auditor leaves the firm shortly/prematurely after having been employed by the firm. 
In the case of internal audit outsourcing, the efficiency of financial audits is bolstered because 
the auditor is able to benefit from knowledge gained during the performance of internal audit 
functions.  The auditor is able to gain a better understanding of the client’s internal controls 
because the auditor has had close experience with the internal control environment as part of the 
client’s internal audit function.
The firm incurs greater costs in employing a new auditor in re acquiring the knowledge which 
the previous auditor had acquired - having left the firm prematurely.  Further, the knowledge 
which could have been employed by the leaving auditor is not fully maximised in the process.
Whilst a segregation of duties and the incorporation of court appointed experts may serve to 
introduce some degree of greater objectivity into the process, greater focus should also be given 
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to non human information gathering techniques which could also generate greater savings - if not 
initially,  but  subsequently  after  the  purchase  of  these  techniques.  Furthermore,  unnecessary 
protracted  discovery  costs  should  be  avoided  whilst  according  greater  focus  to  the  process 
involving  the  final  opinions  of  the  testifying  expert  –  particularly  given  the  tendency  for 
attorneys to do everything possible to waive or shift opinions in favour of their clients.
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